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INTRODUCTION

The wave of popular uprisings that swept across the Arab world starting in December 2010 left no Arab state unscathed. The deafening anthem leading these uprisings, "*Al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam*" (people want to overthrow the regime), rattled authoritarian regimes from Morocco to Oman. Prospects for those long-anticipated democratic transitions seemed bright in the immediate aftermath of authoritarian regime collapse in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Soon enough, however, what had commenced as genuinely peaceful uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria mutated into regime-manufactured sectarian or tribal contests. Authoritarian regimes deployed sectarian conflicts at home or aboard either to insulate themselves from domestic pressures, militarize otherwise peaceful uprisings, or, alternatively, advance their geopolitical objectives.[1] Nowhere was this overlapping use of sectarianism more striking than in Syria. An authoritarian regime sectarianized what had commenced as a national and peaceful popular uprising, while an external actor, Saudi Arabia, deployed sectarianism to topple the Syrian regime as part of a realist strategy aimed at compensating for Riyadh's geopolitical losses in Iraq after the 2003 USA invasion.[2] Tehran also used sectarian symbolism to rally Shi'a fighters from across the Arab world in defense of its Syrian bridgehead into the Arab world and its larger geopolitical interests.[3]

Paradoxically, however, the explosion of sectarianism in the Arab world after the popular uprisings underscores the malleability of sectarian identities and modes of political mobilization. Far from being immutable and ahistorical essences, sectarian identities, like other vertical cleavages, are historical constructions; their intensity and centrality to modes of political mobilization is based on specific political, ideological, and geopolitical contexts. Domestic and regional dynamics in the Arab world have not always been driven by sectarian calculations; nor has sectarianism been the most important marker of political identities and group mobilization. Sectarian cleavages overlapped or cross-cut with other cleavages throughout the process of state formation; their primacy and intensity in a number of Arab states was a result of authoritarian regime strategies.[4] Moreover, sectarian modes of political mobilization thrive on state weakness and ideological vacuums. The lesson of the hitherto short history of the Arab states system is unequivocal in this respect: the salience of

sectarian, tribal, ethnic, regional, or any other vertical or sub-national identity rises as the ideological and material power of the state declines.[5] Across the Arab world, dormant sectarian, tribal, religious, or ethnic affiliations flared up because of state collapse caused by the 2003 USA invasion of Iraq and, later, the militarization and sectarianization of the Arab uprisings.

Lebanon is quintessential in this respect. Since independence, sectarianism was institutionalized in the form of multiple corporate consociational power-sharing arrangements, namely the 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Ta'if Accord, in the context of a centralized but institutionally weak state.[6] Control of state institutions and revenues by an overlapping alliance of sectarian/political and economic elite consecrates a sectarian institutional set-up and lubricates sophisticated clientelist networks that co-opt large segments of the population, thus ensuring that the Lebanese remain unequal sectarian subjects compartmentalized in self-managed communities, rather than citizens with inalienable rights. The closer integration between the country's sectarian/political and economic elite in the postwar period placed the state's fiscal policies at the service of their class interests. This has created a vicious political economic circle whereby sectarian elite control of state institutions and resources produces the kind of socioeconomic policies that serve the material interests of an increasingly tightly integrated and overlapping sectarian/political and economic postwar elite which, in turn, provides them with the material and clientelist wherewithal to reproduce sectarian identities and modes of political mobilization. The relationship between sectarianism and class relations in both pre-war and postwar Lebanon is thus reciprocal rather than linear.[7] Suad Joseph long ago noted how "the barriers of class and sect were inextricably linked" in Lebanon, and how sectarian cleavages tend to uphold the class structure.[8] Similarly, Fawwaz Traboulsi contends that sects serve as "enlarged clientelist networks designed to resist the inequalities of the market and compete for its benefits and for the appropriation of social wealth and services of the state"; they are also adept at "enlisting outside help in their struggle for power or for sheer survival."[9] Far from being irrelevant,[10] then, the centralized but institutionally weak Lebanese state is deployed instrumentally by a sectarian/political elite bent on reproducing sectarian identities and obviating the emergence of alternative, trans-sectarian or non-sectarian, modes of political mobilization. Syria's demolition of the prewar political elite, and the consequent emergence of unipolar or bipolar postwar sectarian leaders dominating the country's major communities, facilitated this dynamic in the postwar era.[11] This mongrel combination of an institutionally weak but centralized state, one in which sectarian actors often align with external patrons to bolster their power against local opponents, sustains a stubborn institutional and clientelist complex, enables the sectarian/political elite to reproduce sectarian identities and

institutional dynamics, and exposes the country to external manipulations, geopolitical contests, and perpetual crisis.

This book joins a wave of post-culturalist studies rejecting ahistorical cultural explanations of Lebanese politics and the durability of sectarian identities.[12] Unlike essentialist and ahistorical primordial explanations of the persistence of sectarianism and sectarian identities in Lebanon, works in this post-culturalist paradigm underscore the very modern and productive power of sectarianism in Lebanese politics. They examine the historicity of sectarian identities,[13] sectarianism as practices of social reproduction, material domination, and national imagination,[14] gendered and class-based resistance to sectarianism,[15] the genealogy of institutionalizing sectarian identities,[16] the impact of sectarian networks and considerations on state institutions and public policies, the provision of social welfare, and the distribution of public expenditures,[17] and, finally, sectarian elite strategies sabotaging postwar civil society organizations (CSOs) trying to promote "institutionalized platforms" within civil society proper,[18] or, alternatively, challenging openly the sectarian system.[19]

On this post-culturalist view, then, and far from being a relic of a traditional pristine past, sectarianism is a modern constitutive Foucauldian socioeconomic and political power that produces and reproduces sectarian subjects and modes of political subjectification and mobilization through a dispersed ensemble of institutional, clientelist, and discursive practices.[20] It is a holistic political economic and ideological system that permeates almost every nook and cranny of Lebanese life, undergirded by a clientelist patronage network and a symbolic repertoire that incorporates large segments of Lebanese society into corporatized sectarian communities.[21] The result is a distorted incentive structure that redirects individual loyalties away from state institutions and symbols and towards sectarian communities, and their political and religious elite. This distorted incentive structure makes it difficult for most people to even think of viable alternatives to the political economy and ideological hegemony of the sectarian system. As a form of socioeconomic and political power, sectarianism serves an array of material and ideological objectives.

The overlapping alliance between members of the sectarian elite and the country's commercial-financial oligarchy "manipulated sectarianism to uphold class."[22] They deployed sectarianism to camouflage the wide income disparities not only among regions but also within sects, and to obfuscate debates about the country's political economy.[23] Sectarianism also serves as a country-wide patronage system that enables an otherwise discordant alliance of political and economic elite to maintain their control over the economy; it perpetuates a lopsided economic model privileging investment in the tertiary sector at the expense of the productive sectors; it protects existing business cartels, and impedes the emergence of a trans-sectarian working-class consciousness and concomitant interest-based rather than identity-based political affiliations.[24]

Sectarianism is often invoked as a fig leaf to normalize a type of everyday lawlessness that, in turn, impedes the emergence of any semblance of rule of law and transparent and accountable institutions: whether in dividing the state apparatus into elite-recognized sectarian fiefdoms, exposing state finances and the country's natural resources to the neopatrimonial predatory appetites of the sectarian elite, in protecting corrupt clients and institutions, in perpetuating regional and sectoral economic disparities, in politicizing everything, from the judiciary and the state's oversight agencies to public sector appointments, sports activities and university campuses,[25] or in sanctioning different forms of violence—especially against women and the voiceless.

Much like other disciplinary institutions—such as the modern state, the prison, or the clinic—the sectarian system and its institutional, political, economic, and symbolic ensemble aim at manufacturing docile sectarian subjects who abide by the rules of the sectarian political economy and its ideological hegemony.[26] The disciplinary tentacles of the sectarian system reach deep into Lebanese society, and operate to reproduce sectarian identities, loyalties, and forms of subjectification. They collectively manufacture disciplined sectarian subjects who embrace what is otherwise a very modern and historically constructed "culture of sectarianism" as their primary and primordial identity.[27] These tentacles stretch across the different public and private spheres of Lebanese life.

Instead of championing its own vision of an inclusive, polyphonic, and trans-sectarian democratic citizenship, the institutionally weak Lebanese state "assimilated the logic of kinship as an institution of governance."[28] In turn, the sectarian elite's deployment of kinship as a tool of political control "reinforced the utility of kinship in the lives of ordinary citizens and underwritten the civic myth of sectarian pluralism that has glossed it."[29] This has served to buttress the sectarian system's clientelist and patronage *raison d'être* which, consequently, hardens sectarian modes of political subjectification. As mentioned, the result is a distorted incentive structure whereby "there has been little public morality to make leaders accountable to the general public or to make the state accountable to its general citizenry or to make citizens loyal and accountable to the state, beyond the morality of the highly personal relationships legitimated by kin moralities."[30] Personal status laws, the educational curricula of private schools, recreational and sports clubs, the print and audio-visual media, political parties, and electoral laws operate contrapuntally to harden sectarian loyalties and reproduce sectarian modes of subjectification. Even public space is securitized and divided into separate sectarian zones with their own security apparatus and their own definition of what constitutes a threat or the enemy.[31] As the following chapters demonstrate, the hegemony of sectarian forms of subjectification is not the product of an imagined "essential" Lebanese identity; it is rather the result of the operation of an ensemble of institutional, clientelist, and discursive practices

at different levels. The disciplinary tentacles of the sectarian system also shape its own political economy.

The late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's postwar reconstruction plan and neoliberal economic policies created a deeper integration among the country's sectarian/political and economic elite at the expense of sound fiscal and monetary policies and the accountability and transparency of state institutions.[32] The postwar economy was managed as an enterprise controlled by an alliance of political and business partners. Whole sectors of the economy—especially the electricity sector, telecommunications, health care, waste management, customs and port facilities, stone quarries, and the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District (BCD)—operated in a non-competitive and non-transparent manner.[33] The lion's share of postwar state expenditures and debts were accumulated on kickbacks and wasteful spending, excessive interest payments on Lebanese Treasury bills (T-bills) and their derivative financial transfers to the banking sector, rents siphoned out of the country by Syrian officials,[34] public employment expenditures, and, finally, regional and sectarian redistributional strategies—such as those by the Council of the South and the Fund for the Displaced—that aimed at recalibrating the pre-war bias in government spending in favor of Beirut and Mount Lebanon or financially compensating wartime refugees and the displaced.[35] Sectarian considerations regulated the competition over state resources, contracts, and commissions. Government spending and public employment policies were placed at the service of the personal interests and the clientelist calculations of the sectarian/political elite and their partners in private business. The corruption of the public sector served as a disguised patronage and clientelist system binding sectarian clients to their political patrons. As Reinoud Leenders demonstrates persuasively, "by turning [public] institutions into bastions of privilege for their supporters, political elites tried to compensate for the weak support of their constituencies."[36] Finally, postwar fiscal policy led to substantial "distributive and rent seeking predatory activities" by the sectarian/political elite.[37] Justified by the political elite as the price of the postwar peace, and blamed in great part on the era of *Pax Syriana* (1990–2005), these practices consecrated a very sectarian postwar political economy with its attendant clientelist and patronage networks. This political economy of sectarianism shaping postwar fiscal and monetary policies consolidated the sectarian system's clientelist and patronage networks and, consequently, prevented the emergence of a sense of trans-sectarian inclusive citizenship among the Lebanese.[38]

Perpetuating a pre-war pattern of the tertiarization and deindustrialization of the Lebanese economy, postwar economic planning continued to favor the commercial, financial, and services sectors at the expense of the agricultural and industrial sectors.[39] Capital inflows, remittances by Lebanese living abroad,[40] overseas development assistance funds and Arab deposits, interest payments

on bank deposits, and high-interest T-bills created a postwar finance-biased model of development and a rentier economy that suffocated the industrial sector and "shifted the economy towards commerce and the production of non-tradeables."[41] Although the monopolistic structure of the Lebanese economy is a pre-war phenomenon, the postwar fiscal and monetary policies intensified this trend. The recycled and reinvented postwar "merchant republic"[42] composed of an alliance between the sectarian/political elite and their business partners in the financial, commercial, and tertiary sectors managed the economy as an archipelago of cartels monopolizing a range of industries and exclusive import licenses beyond any semblance of accountability.[43] For example, the supply of pharmaceuticals, cement, energy products, gas, and asphalt is concentrated in a handful of companies: five companies control 50 percent of the market for pharmaceutical imports; seven companies control some 60 percent of fuel products' imports; one company controls 95 percent of gas imports; four companies control the import of asphalt; and, finally, three companies monopolize the supply of cement in the country. Moreover, 2004 statistics suggest that only 1,000 of a total of 250,000 importers control some 90 percent of the import market.[44]

Postwar fiscal and monetary policies maintained and even deepened the sectoral imbalances and income disparities that had shaped a pre-war economy serving primarily the private interests of an "externally oriented mercantile-financial bourgeoisie."[45] In the early 1960s, the celebrated IRFED (*Institut International de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Développement Harmonisé*) mission had estimated that "the richest 4 per cent of Lebanese received 33 per cent of national income, while half of the population which was characterized as poor secured only 18 per cent of national income."[46] Postwar indicators are even more staggering. In 2013 the Banque du Liban, Lebanon's central bank, estimated that half of all accumulated 2012 bank deposits were concentrated in 0.8 percent of all bank accounts, in other words, less than 500 depositors controlled some US$62 billion of a total of US$151 billion worth of bank deposits and commercial banks' assets.[47] Another 2013 report estimated that "half a percent of Lebanese adults," or a mere 8,900 adults, "own half the country's wealth," and that the country's six billionaires control some 15 percent of all private wealth in the country.[48] The monopolistic and lopsided features of the postwar economy surpassed those of the pre-war one.[49] The synergy between the overlapping sectarian/political and economic elite created a postwar political economy that plays an instrumental role in the reproduction of sectarian modes of subjectification and mobilization and, concomitantly, in sabotaging the emergence of alternative, trans-sectarian or non-sectarian, types of identities.

Although wrapped in velvet clientelist and ideological gloves, the violence of the sectarian system is profound though not always discernible or physical.

Most men and women suffer from the sectarian system's disciplinary techniques, women far more extensively and violently than men, however. To start with, the disciplinary logic of the sectarian system denies Lebanese their existence as citizens with inalienable political and social rights, reducing them instead to unequal members of state-recognized sectarian communities regulated by extended patriarchal kinship groups and clientelist networks. Its distorted incentive structure devalues merit as a prerequisite for personal success and for access to public or private institutions, while the absence of rule of law and accountability allows innumerable forms of criminality—domestic violence especially against women, petty crime, theft of public assets and lands, and sectarian vigilantism—to pass with impunity. Moreover, the political economy of sectarianism is undergirded by a highly regressive tax system, sectarianized public expenditures, and fiscal policies that impoverish the lower and middle classes while protecting the privileges of the commercial, financial, and tertiary sectors and their rentier profits.[50] Resisting sectarian forms of subjectification invites both political economic and symbolic forms of punishment: Lebanese who refuse to abide by the rules of the sectarian system are not only excluded from its clientelist and political rewards, but may even find themselves denied proper burial rites.

By binding Lebanese to their sectarian/political patrons and clientelist networks, and by making them materially dependent on the latter's patronage benefits, the political economy of sectarianism operates in such a way as to sabotage experiments in non-sectarian forms of political mobilization and organization, forcing most Lebanese to privilege their sectarian identities over alternative and more appropriate class, professional, or local affiliations. An employee in the public sector, an officer in any one of the state's multiple security institutions, or even a member of the Constitutional Court will not necessarily act as members of autonomous state institutions, but are more likely to act as protégés and clients of sectarian leaders. Similarly, instead of organizing inter-sectarian class alliances to demand their socioeconomic rights and rectify the extremely lopsided distribution of national resources and wealth, same-class members from across sectarian divides often express their economic deprivations and frustrations in violent acts against each other, and always in the name of the sect.[51] Violence against the sectarian "other" thus becomes a form of catharsis from the personal indignity incurred by a very sectarian political economy. It complicates any attempt at a peaceful reconciliation and accommodation of the very stubborn and diverse social, political, and economic "visions of Lebanon"[52] subscribed to by different sectarian communities.[53] This Gramscian combination of consent and coercion in the operation of the sectarian system reproduces and hardens sectarian modes of political identification and mobilization at the expense of the emergence of national, inter-sectarian socioeconomic movements and alliances.[54]

SECTARIANISM AS PRACTICES OF GOVERNANCE

This book differs considerably from existing accounts of sectarianism in Lebanese politics. It examines a theme that is often assumed rather than demonstrated empirically.[55] Most accounts of sectarianism in Lebanon tend to be either historical surveys:[56] they focus on one party or sect—most recently Hizbullah and the Shiʿa community,[57] or are journalistic descriptions of cyclical political crises and violent conflicts that lack any meaningful analysis of the reproduction of sectarian modes of political subjectification and mobilization in postwar Lebanon.[58] We also move beyond the impassioned—at the popular level, at least—debate pertaining to the internal or external causes of the war,[59] and, at the academic level, discussions of the role played by Lebanon's institutional make-up, namely its consociational democracy, in the outbreak of the war.[60] Rather, the following chapters offer thick descriptions of how sectarian modes of political subjectification and mobilization are reproduced in postwar Lebanon in different contexts and at different levels of analysis. We survey snapshots of the complex ensemble of institutional, clientelist, and discursive practices that sustain the political economy and ideological hegemony of the sectarian system. Our main aim is to unpack what James Tully labels the formal and informal "practices of governance" that reproduce sectarian modes of political subjectification and mobilization in postwar Lebanon.[61] We consequently look at the institutional, political economic, state–society, discursive, and elite and non-elite practices that "aim to structure the field of the possible actions of others," and subsequently reproduce a sectarian form of politics and subjectification.[62] This is only part of the landscape we survey in this book, however, because where there is disciplinary power, there is also resistance to this power.[63]

Despite its disciplinary violence, there are always ways to resist the sectarian system's combination of consent and coercion. Thus in this book, we survey the variety of "practices of freedom"[64] by opponents of the sectarian system, be they women, workers, students, CSOs, or coalitions across NGOs that aim at undermining the sectarian system's hegemony in the long struggle to reform it in piecemeal but important ways, and also examine how these practices of freedom are sabotaged or contained by a range of actors. What ultimately emerges from this survey, then, is a complex ensemble that stretches over substantial areas of everyday life, reproducing sectarian modes of political subjectification and mobilization, demarcating the parameters of the possible, which prevents the emergence of any semblance of rule of law or accountability, and, finally, which is always ready to undermine the challenges to the political economy and ideological hegemony of the sectarian system.

In addition to exposing the disciplinary violence of Lebanon's sectarian system, this book contributes empirical evidence to current theoretical debates about the limitations of institutional engineering in engendering peace in deeply

divided postwar or post-transition societies.[65] The USA invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent experiments in postwar nation building, have restored this debate to a central position in the Comparative Politics literature; and Lebanon, despite its presumed idiosyncrasy, has many caveats to offer specialists and policy-makers alike, a topic to which we return at the end of this book. Finally, and at a time of the growing sectarianization of otherwise realist regional geopolitical contests, and as a number of Arab states find themselves picking up the pieces of states and societies shattered by the transformations wrought by the Arab uprisings, this book underscores the long-term pitfalls that follow on from the institutionalization of religious, ethnic, sectarian, or tribal divisions into prospective post-authoritarian power-sharing arrangements. After all, what may seem as a short-term relief from the always constructed and geopolitically instigated sectarian, ethnic, or tribal conflicts may develop into a permanent and holistic political economy and ideological hegemony with its inescapable disciplinary practices and violence.

The balance of the book is organized in a manner that exposes the workings of the sectarian system's ensemble of institutional, clientelist, and discursive practices. Chapter 2 offers a brief overview of the main patterns of Lebanese political history. It examines the historical invention of sectarian identities in Mount Lebanon and their subsequent institutionalization in multiple corporate power-sharing arrangements. The chapter then offers a succinct account of the politics of sectarianism under *Pax Syriana* (1990–2005) and later in post-Syria Lebanon. Chapter 3 looks at the role of state institutions and policies in the production and reproduction of sectarian subjects and modes of political mobilization. By placing family law under the purview of sectarian courts, the state contributes to the reproduction of the kind of affiliations that reify the sectarian system. Surveying the battles between, on the one hand, the sectarian/political and religious elite and, on the other, social activists, over legislation reforms pertaining to personal matters, the chapter reveals the strategies used by the former elite to impede the emergence of alternatives to sectarian modes of subjectification. The same objective is achieved when state institutions allocate welfare subsidies to finance sectarian-controlled social institutions or operate as camouflaged clientelist networks serving the protégés of the sectarian/political elite. The result is a state-sponsored sectarian welfare system financing the sectarian/political elite's clientelist networks and undergirding the political economy of the sectarian system. Chapter 4 turns to the strategies deployed by the sectarian/political elite to divide, besiege, and ultimately co-opt civil society actors, denying them the possibility of producing an alternative form of discourse and politics. It investigates the impact of state laws and bureaucratic practices as well as the postwar neoliberal governance model on the incorporation of associational life into the sectarian postwar political economy. A similar theme is studied in Chapter 5, this time focusing on the

strategies used by the sectarian/political elite and their clients to divide the labor movement along sectarian lines, turning it from a once vociferous protagonist of workers' rights and social justice to a tamed protégé. The chapter also surveys struggles from outside the labor movement on behalf of workers' rights and collective action and, invariably, the tactics deployed by the sectarian/political elite to obfuscate them. Chapter 6 examines the relation between institutional design and the reproduction of sectarian identities in the postwar era. It looks at the impact of electoral system design, gerrymandering, and malapportionment on the reproduction of sectarian modes of subjectification and mobilization at the expense of cross-sectarian national ones. The chapter also reviews alternative proposals submitted by CSOs as well as different members of the sectarian/political elite to move elections in Lebanon away from the dominance of simple plurality voting systems, and the sectarian/political elite's strategies to resist the promulgation of electoral laws that may emancipate voters from sectarian and clientelist incentive structures. Aram Nerguizian's contribution to this book in Chapter 7 looks at the impact of sectarian dynamics on one of postwar Lebanon's most important institutions: the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The postwar LAF—especially since the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country—finds itself increasingly penetrated and besieged by sectarian calculations, while at the same time working to shield Lebanon's tenuous sectarian order from the corrosive effects of Syria's civil war by accelerating its own professionalization and through the expansion of its military capabilities. The result is a military institution juggling to retain its internal autonomy and military efficacy in the face of growing domestic and transnational security threats. Paradoxically, however, the LAF and the sectarian/political elite increasingly find themselves entangled in a puzzling form of civil–military interdependence, one that is as important for the future political prospects of the latter as it is for the institutional development of the former. Shifting to a different level of analysis, Chapter 8 turns to the effects of the privately-owned visual media on postwar sectarian relations. It presents empirical examples of how the postwar visual media aggravates sectarian relations and is often used as a tool of sectarian demonization in the process of creating the sectarian "Other". Tied umbilically to the sectarian/political elite, the visual media emerges as both producer and instigator of sectarian sentiments. Chapter 9 zooms in on one of the sectarian/political elite's most powerful postwar institutionalized members: Hizbullah. It looks at how the party's local priorities resonate with the sectarian system's ideological hegemony and consequently intensify sectarian modes of subjectification and mobilization in postwar Lebanon, and how its omnipotent domestic capabilities and proxy role in the service of Iran's geopolitical interests aggravate sectarian tensions in Lebanon and the region. The result is a powerful non-state actor, but one that is nevertheless encircled by a web of overlapping threats at the local and regional levels. Finally, Chapter 10 closes the book with

a discussion of the different structural, institutional, and para-institutional reforms entailed in moving Lebanon away from the hegemony of sectarianism and towards a different kind of politics, and the inevitable resistance any such reforms are bound to face from the existing sectarian/political elite.

Before proceeding any further, however, a note on some of the terminology used in this book. The reader will come across in the next chapters such terms as confessional elite, sectarian/political elite, economic elite, and religious elite. These terms are selected intentionally and for analytical purposes. For the pre-war years, we use the term confessional elite to refer to the traditional political class or the *zu'ama'* who monopolized politics in Lebanon after independence and until the outbreak of the civil war. The choice of terminology reflects this book's assumption that the main—but not the only—political cleavages in the pre-war years were confessional rather than sectarian. In the postwar era, sectarian modes of subjectification and mobilization became more pronounced as the sectarian balance of political power was renegotiated in the Ta'if Accord. Consequently, we deploy the term sectarian/political elite to describe that political class that came to power in postwar Lebanon. Given their increased integration after the war, some members of this latter group also constitute part of the postwar economic elite. This overlap between the postwar sectarian/political elite and the economic elite is best exemplified in the person of Rafiq al-Hariri and later Saad al-Hariri, though Najib Miqati and Mohammad Safadi offer equally illustrative examples. To be sure, however, not all of the members of the postwar economic elite are members of the sectarian/political elite. While they may occasionally assume ministerial portfolios or parliamentary seats, their real vocation is in the business rather than political sphere. Finally, the religious elite refer strictly to the spiritual leaders of Lebanon's multiple sectarian communities.